Melchi v. Burns International Security Services (1984), 597 F.Supp. 575. Employer's knowledge of employee's participation in protected activity is simply factor to consider in determining principal question whether employee's discharge was caused by his participation, rather than additional element which must be proved to satisfy employee's initial burden under whistleblower's protection act.

Melchi v. Burns International Security Services (1984), 597 F.Supp. 575. In context of claim for retaliatory discharge, employee retains ultimate burden of proving that discharge would not have occurred had there been no protected activity; mere production by employer of legitimate business reason underlying discharge of employee will not sterilize unlawful retaliation where latter is controlling factor.

Melchi v. Burns International Security Services (1984), 597 F.Supp. 575. Appropriate damages to employee who established that he was discharged in violation of whistleblower's protection act were award of back pay, including vacation benefits, but not reinstatement or actual damages, in view of evidence that employee may have acted in part with improper motives in reporting employer's falsification of records to NLRB.

Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc. (1982), 686 F.2d 793. Employer who had decided upon new policy was not guilty of unlawful retaliation simply because it proceeded with imposition of that policy after learning that one of its employees who would be affected thereby had recently engaged in activity protected by Title VII, but if new policy was used selectively against employee in retaliation for protected activities, there would be violation of Title VII.

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248. In a "whistleblower" appeal, the burden of proof remains at all times with the appellant; appellant also bears the burden of production to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of the elements of its prima facie case, which are (1) that he complied with the requirements of R.C. 124.341 by filing a written report with the proper parties and (2) that, after filing such a report, the appointing authority took disciplinary or retaliatory action as a result of that filing.

Womack v. Munson (1980), 610 F.2d 1292. Defendant did not have to prove absence of a retaliatory motive and articulate a legitimate reason for plaintiff's dismissal, but only had to produce evidence that would dispel inference of retaliation by establishing existence of a legitimate reason; the overall burden of persuasion remained with plaintiff to establish that the alleged legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for dismissal was in fact a pretext, a cover-up for retaliation.

State ex rel. Cuyahoga County v. State Personnel Board of Review (1998), -- Ohio St.3d --, 1998-Ohio-191. SPBR patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal of a county employee filed pursuant to R.C. 124.341. View Supreme Court Decision | View Court of Appeals Decision | View SPBR Order

Fox v. Bowling Green (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 534. To gain the protection of R.C. 4113.52(A)(3), an employee need not show that a co-worker had actually violated a statute, city ordinance, work rule, or company policy; it is sufficient that the employee had a reasonable belief that the violation occurred.

Neal v. Hamilton County (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 670; cert denied 67 Ohio St.3d 1481. To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, the employee must show, in addition to elements required to establish a prima facie discrimination case, that 1) she engaged in a protected activity; 2) employer knew of her participation in protected activity; and 3) alleged retaliatory action followed the employee's participation in protected activity sufficiently close in time to warrant an inference of retaliatory motivation.

Neal v. Hamilton County (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d 670; cert denied 67 Ohio St.3d 1481. If employee meets burden of establishing prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, employer must then articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action and employee must then show that reason was pretextual; employee cannot prevail on claim of retaliatory discharge if it appears from the evidence that employer would have made the same decision regardless of employee's participation in a protected activity.

Bear v. Geetronics, Inc. (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 163; cert denied 66 Ohio St.3d 1424. Termination of at-will supervisor who complained about illegal alcohol consumption by minor employees on premises did not violate "whistleblower act," where supervisor did not provide written notice to any superiors regarding complained-of conduct prior to termination; such termination did not give rise to public policy exception to employment-at-will doctrine because public policy concerns had been codified through passage of act.

Robins v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control (June 25, 1996), Franklin App. No. 96APE01-38, unreported, 1996 WL *****. Although both R.C. 124.341 and R.C. 4113.52 may apply to state employees, provisions in each nonetheless prevent an employee from pursuing remedies under both; because R.C. 4113.52 covers state employees and areas not covered by R.C. 124.341, the nature of the wrongdoing reported is dispositive. View Court of Appeals Decision | View Common Pleas Decision

McCreary v. State Personnel Board of Review (Feb. 18, 1993), Franklin Co., No. 92CVF-07-5826, unreported. An employee must file a written report with the pertinent official or officials named in R.C. 124.341(A) prior to the time the appointing authorities are alleged to have taken retaliatory action against him, in order to establish a prima facie case in a whistleblower appeal filed with the state personnel board of review. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Bryant v. Ohio Dept. of Industrial Relations (Mar. 4, 1992), Franklin Co., No. 91CVF-07-5872, unreported. The right of free speech, and the necessity to protect individuals in government service from retaliation for "whistle blowing" must be balanced by a concurrent responsibility of the employee to act reasonably; before bringing her charge public, appellant should have availed herself of the opportunity to establish the truth of what she stated. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Thevenin v. Columbus Developmental Center (Apr. 25, 1991), PBR 90-LAY-08-0869; aff'd (May 22, 1991), Full Board; dismissed (Sept. 12, 1991), Franklin Co., No. 91CVF-06-4602. Employee's filing of a written report with an entity other than his supervisor, his appointing authority, or the appropriate law enforcement officer, does not fulfill the necessary prerequisites of R.C. 124.341. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Freeman v. Ohio State University (Mar. 7, 1990), PBR 89-REM-07-0366. The state personnel board of review may hear appeals from bargaining unit employees even when they are ordinarly exempted from the board's jurisdiction, since an appeal under R.C. 124.341(D) is the "sole and exclusive remedy, notwithstanding any other provision of law." View SPBR Order</