Powers & Duties of Appointing Authorities
9. Suspension
Gillard v. Norris (1988), 857 F.2d 1095. Reprimand and subsequent temporary suspension for period of three days as result of accumulated disciplinary actions constituted de minimis property deprivation not deserving of due process consideration.
Mowery v. Adams (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 116. State employee was not deprived without due process of property interest in his employment when he was suspended for thirteen days; fact that predeprivation hearing was informal did not compel finding that employee was denied due process, and employee received notice of charges against him, explanation of state's evidence, opportunity to present his side of the story, and postdeprivation process in form of appeal to state personnel board of review, where he was given opportunity to present evidence on merits of his case and to cross-examine state's witnesses.
Scott v. Reinier (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 289; aff'd Scott v. Reinier (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 67. The state personnel board of review may change a removal order to one of suspension only if it considers all of the evidence used by the appointing authority when such authority made its disposition.
Beyer v. Donaldson (1978), 57 Ohio App.2d 24. Where the charter of a city obligates the city manager to make all appointments and removals in the administrative and executive service of the city, provided they are in consonance with state laws respecting civil service, such supersedes the provision of a statute relating to the suspension of police officers by a chief of police.
Carmichael v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services (Aug. 6, 1992), Franklin App. No. 92AP-82, unreported, 1992 WL 193706. R.C. 119.12 does not provide for an appeal to the common pleas court from a thirty-day suspension. View Court of Appeals Decision
Adkins v. City of Portsmouth (Mar. 20, 1986), Scioto App. No. 1549, unreported. A municipal civil service commission has no power pursuant to R.C. 124.34 to hear appeals by classified civil service employees who are suspended, demoted, or removed; the administrative denial of sick leave benefits does not constitute a suspension as that word is generally used. View Court of Appeals Decision
Burch v. City of Cuyahoga Falls (Aug. 7, 1985), Summit App. No. 11952, unreported, 1985 WL 11035. A second suspension is unlawful when the employee is being disciplined twice for the same incident.
State, ex rel. Kaminsky v. Civil Service Commission (Sept. 5, 1979), Cuyahoga App. No. 40365, unreported. Writ of mandamus denied when employee seeks to compel the civil service commission to hear his appeal from a suspension order when civil service rule 9.21 provides that the employee does not have a legal right to appeal his suspension with the commission and the employee has an adequate remedy at law by means of a declaratory judgment.
Tolber v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation (Mar. 28, 1996), Franklin Co., No. 95CVF08-6040, unreported. Where appellant was following an accepted agency practice, discipline may be modified from removal to suspension for falsification of information appearing on employee's time cards. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order
Jakubic v. Ohio University, et al. (Nov. 27, 1995), Belmont Co., No. 94-CV-142, unreported. Where appellee failed to prove any of the specific allegations contained in the R.C. 124.34 order removing appellant, the state personnel board of review had the authority to modify appellant's discipline to a thirty-day suspension for neglect of duty demonstrated by appellant's lack of discretion in the performance of his job duties. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order
Rapier v. Darke County Board of MR/DD (Mar. 10, 1993), Franklin Co., No. 92-CV-09-7589, unreported. The full scope of due process does not extend to short suspensions; the state personnel board of review has no jurisdiction under R.C. 124.34 to hear an appeal of a three-day suspension and no legal authority to modify the law as written by the General Assembly. View Common Pleas Decision
Combs v. Holmes County Sheriff (May 31, 1991), PBR 90-REM-11-1050; aff'd (July 15, 1991), Full Board; aff'd (July 31, 1992), Tuscarawas Co., No. 91AA-070-314, unreported. Although appellant was not insubordinate in his failure to comply with the appointing authority's unreasonable request that he conform to its previously uncommunicated residency requirement, his evasive and insubordinate behavior after he received notice of the requirement supported the imposition of a thirty-day suspension. View SPBR Order
Porter v. Ohio Dept. of Administrative Services (Apr. 28, 1992), PBR 90-SUS-10-1005 (Porter II); aff'd (May 26, 1992), Full Board; aff'd (July 1992), Franklin Co., No. 92CVF06-4643, unreported; remanded (Mar. 1993), Franklin App. No. 92AP-1139, unreported, 1993 WL 86978. While an employee might overcome the barrier of confidentiality to introduce communications between herself and another within the attorney-client relationship, when the communications comprised some part of the particulars within the order of suspension at issue, and have the matter revealed against the wishes of the client holding the privilege, she may not seek to publicize the communications of another lawyer and that lawyer's client without a waiver of the confidentiality privilege. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order
Campbell v. Franklin County Sheriff (Aug. 31, 1990), Franklin Co., Nos. 90-CVH-04-2800 and 90-CVH-04-2766, unreported. Absent any proof that the reputation of the Franklin County sheriff's department was injured, appellant's misdeameanor violation of a safety statute in another county and subsequent report of the incident to the appointing authority in compliance with departmental regulations does not constitute unbecoming conduct sufficient to warrant suspension or removal. View Common Pleas Decision
Dennis v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services (Jan. 30, 1992), PBR 91-SUS-09-0577; aff'd (Mar. 12, 1992), Full Board. Where an employee violated work rules by using a greater amount of force than necessary to diffuse a disruptive situation, discipline may be mitigated by the employee's previously unblemished disciplinary history and the potential seriousness of the situation. View SPBR Order
Quinn v. Lucas County Sheriff (Nov. 7, 1990), PBR 90-SUS-04-0174. Following the principles of progressive discipline, a sixty-day suspension is appropriate discipline where a corrections officer grabbed an inmate by the back of the neck in such a manner as to leave scratches and cuts around the neck area and upper back, but the use of force was not effected by the corrections officer in order to protect himself. View SPBR Order
Nelson v. Tecumseh Consortium (Feb. 17, 1989), PBR 88-SUS-10-0542. Where an entity not in service to the state or county files a suspension order with the state personnel board of review, equity does not operate to confer jurisdiction on the board; subject matter jurisdiction of the board is statutory and may not be conferred by an agreement of the parties. View SPBR Order
Bleininger v. Tuscarawas County Dept. of Human Services (Sept. 29, 1982), PBR 82-REM-06-2080. An employee may not be removed for failure of good behavior where employer fails to follow progressive discipline scheme and generally permits the employee to behave in such a manner; suspension, however, may be an appropriate discipline. View SPBR Order