Powers & Duties of Appointing Authorities

7. Removal

Collins v. Voinovich, et al. (Dec. 21, 1995), U.S. District Court, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, No. 1:93cv1898, unreported. The relevant focus in determining whether a government attorney is protected against discharge for political reasons is to ascertain the inherent duties of that position, not the actual work performed by the attorney (citing Monks v. Marlinga (1991), 923 F.2d 423; Williams v. City of River Rouge (1990), 909 F.2d 151). View U.S. District Court Decision

Mauzy, et al. v. Kelly Services, Inc., et al. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578. Where a plaintiff alleging unlawful age discrimination chooses termination in lieu of transfer, her decision cannot be construed as an actual discharge under former R.C. 4101.17, but she may establish by sufficient evidence that she was constructively discharged; the test for determining whether an employee was constructively discharged is whether the employer's actions made working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have felt compelled to resign.

Painter v. Graley (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 377. To state claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that employer's act of discharging him contravened clear public policy; clear public policy sufficient to justify exception to employment-at-will doctrine is not limited to public policy expressed by general assembly in form of statutory enactments, but may also be discerned as a matter of law based on other sources.

State, ex rel. Baran v. Fuerst (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 413. Mandamus is a proper remedy for reinstatement and back pay when an employee is removed from his position contrary to law and the employee is wrongfully excluded from employment during that period.

City of Warrensville Heights v. Jennings (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 206. A police officer may be dismissed for just cause when he refuses to obey a superior's reasonable order to take a polygraph test providing he has been informed as part of such order of the subject of the intended inquiry, which is specifically and narrowly related to the performance of the officer's official duties; that the officer's answers cannot be used against him in any subsequent criminal prosecution; and that the penalty for refusal is dismissal.

Bashford v. City of Portsmouth (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 195. When a collective bargaining agreement does not specifically mention the subject of probationary employee termination, state and local laws govern such termination.

Walton v. Montgomery County Welfare Dept. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 58. The state personnel board of review lacks jurisdiction to review removals on the merits during the second half of an employee's probationary period.

Parfitt v. Columbus Correctional Facility (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 434. In the absence of prejudice, a public employee in challenging his removal from employment may not assert the employer agency's procedural rules, unless that employee is a member of the class which the rule was intended to benefit.

Bilchek v. State Personnel Board of Review (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 181. The state personnel board of review has jurisdiction over appeals from termination of employment of deputy sheriffs.

In re Termination of Employment of Pratt v. Moore (1974), 40 Ohio St.2d 107; cert denied 46 Ohio St.2d 88. A party adversely affected by an order of the state personnel board of review may appeal the order of the board to the court of common pleas of the county in which the affected employee resides, and may, in that court, raise the issue of the board's jurisdiction to issue the order.

Cameron v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 20. Highway maintenance superintendent should not have been removed from his position for failing to timely obtain commercial driver's license as required by settlement agreement pursuant to which he was assigned to position; he substantially complied by ultimately obtaining commercial driver's license, albeit after deadline imposed by settlement agreement, and his actions did not constitute incompetence or nonfeasance. View Court of Appeals Decision | View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Hayes v. Cleveland Pneumatic Company (1993), 92 Ohio App.3d 36; cert denied 69 Ohio St.3d 1415. Drug addiction and depression are handicaps for purposes of the antihandicap discrimination law; adverse effect of handicap on job performance is just cause for dismissal.

Hall v. Johnson (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 451; dismissed 68 Ohio St.3d 1447. Toxicology reports showing cocaine in employee's urine, which formed basis for employee's dismissal, were highly questionable, in view of fact that employee was not tested under conditions required by administrative regulation governing procedures used when testing for drugs.

Frank v. Toledo Hospital (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 610. Hospital employee who was unable to receive required rubella vaccination because she was pregnant was not victim of sex discrimination when she was discharged, rather than offered maternity leave, absent evidence that hospital's rubella policy applied only to pregnant employees, required that pregnant employees be discharged, or had disparate impact upon pregnant employees.

Frank v. Toledo Hospital (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 610. Failure to make leave available to pregnant employee in lieu of terminating her is not discriminatory unless it is shown that such employee was terminated because of, or on basis of, sex, including pregnancy.

Fields v. Summit County Executive Branch (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 68; cert denied 66 Ohio St.3d 1474. Provisions of collective bargaining agreement entered into pursuant to applicable statute prevail over conflicting laws; collective bargaining agreement stating that new hire probationary employee could be terminated at any time during probationary period and have no right to appeal, and providing for final and binding internal review of grievance indicated no right to appeal to state personnel board of review.

Veney v. Massillon Psychiatric Center (1991), 66 Ohio App.3d 665. "Revocation of appointment," for purposes of rules covering civil service, does not sever total employment but merely reverts unclassified employee to his prior status as classified employee; "removal of employee," for purposes of civil service, involves complete termination of an unclassified employee for cause which is sufficient to terminate a classified employee.

Veney v. Massillon Psychiatric Center (1991), 66 Ohio App.3d 665. Revocation of appointment of state employee as a nonclassified service employee, and his return to prior position within classified service, was a "revocation of appointment" which did not require hearing or other procedures applicable to removal of employee.

Heatwall v. Village of Boston Heights (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 96; dismissed 70 Ohio St.3d 1466. The dismissal of a village police officer is improper and void when not in compliance with the provisions of R.C. 737.19.

Abbot v. Stepanik (1990), 64 Ohio App.3d 719. Juvenile detention center part-time employees who claimed to have been wrongfully terminated were defined by statute as being outside classified civil service, so were not entitled to statutory protection against termination for other than just cause.

Conner v. Lakemore (1988), 48 Ohio App.3d 52. When a village police chief appeals his dismissal to the village counsel and requests a public hearing pursuant to R.C. 737.19, R.C. 121.22(G) precludes the holding of an executive session by the village council to consider the dismissal of the police chief; no public body shall hold an executive session for the discipline of an elected official for conduct related to the performance of his official duties or for his removal from office.

Hobbie v. Medina (1985), 29 Ohio App.3d 306. A person may not be discharged from public service solely because he invokes his privilege against self-incrimination; however, where a police officer is not required to waive his privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof, the privilege does not bar the dismissal of a police officer who refuses to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly related to the performance of his official duties.

Maiden v. Fayette County Board of MR/DD (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 196. The state personnel board of review, upon a proper review of all the factors affecting the appointing authority's removal order, has the authority to affirm the adjudication, but may modify the punishment when mitigating factors call for a less severe penalty.

Swolsky Enterprises v. Halterman (1983), 12 Ohio App.3d 23. An employee may be dismissed for just cause when the employee signed a pre-employment agreement agreeing to submit to a polygraphic examination but later refuses to do so.

Resek v. Seven Hills (1983), 9 Ohio App.3d 224. A police chief is properly removed from his position when he sells tickets for a political fund raising event in contravention of R.C. 124.57.

Watson v. Schwenker (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 294. The dishonesty for which removal of a civil service employee may be justified under R.C. 124.34 need not be job-related or the basis for criminal punishment.

Scott v. Reinier (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 289; aff'd Scott v. Reinier (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 67. The state personnel board of review may change a removal order to one of suspension only if it considers all of the evidence used by the appointing authority when such authority made its disposition.

Beyer v. Donaldson (1978), 57 Ohio App.2d 24. Where the charter of a city obligates the city manager to make all appointments and removals in the administrative and executive service of the city, provided they are in consonance with state laws respecting civil service, such supersedes the provision of a statute relating to the suspension of police officers by a chief of police.

State, ex rel. Ashbaugh v. Bahr (1941), 68 Ohio App. 308. "Failure of good behavior" enumerated in Section 486-17a, General Code, as ground for removal of a civil service employee, and "conduct unbecoming an employee" enumerated in the rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commission of the city of Youngstown as ground for removal, mean one and the same thing and are not in conflict.

State, ex rel. Ashbaugh v. Bahr (1941), 68 Ohio App.308. Where a written notice of removal of a civil service employee for "misconduct unbecoming an employee of the civil service commission," sets forth facts upon which such misconduct is based, in answer to which the employee files an intelligent explanation of the reasons for her conduct, such notice is sufficient to apprise the employee of the facts comprising the reason for her removal and is valid.

State, ex rel. Ashbaugh v. Bahr (1941), 68 Ohio App.308. In the removal of a civil service employee for failure of good behavior based on the commission of a criminal offense by the employee, it is not necessary that such employee be first convicted of such offense after presentment or indictment by grand jury.

Sizemore v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Corrections (1992), 63 Ohio Misc.2d 319. Correctional officer who was discharged after his driver's license was suspended for having eleven convictions of OMVI failed to make sufficient showing that he was an alcoholic or that he was discharged for his alcholism to establish that he was unlawfully discharged based on handicap; mere fact that employee had eleven separate OMVI convictions did not prove he was an alcoholic, and correctional institution had just cause to discharge correctional officer, in accordance with its policies, based on suspension of his driver's license and his taking actions that could compromise his ability to perform his job effectively. View SPBR Order

Brown v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (Sept. 16, 1996), Marion App. No. 9-96-25, unreported, 1996 WL 518116. The effect of reinstatement is to say that one was not an employee but should have been and is, therefore, entitled to back pay; where Appellant was terminated prior to the time of his felony conviction, Appellant was not an employee and Appellee did not have the capacity to terminate him based on his felony conviction until Appellant's reinstatement. View Court of Appeals Decision | View SPBR Order

Brown v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (Sept. 16, 1996), Marion App. No. 9-96-25, unreported, 1996 WL 518116. While it is permissible to terminate an employee who has already been removed a second time in order to limit possible damages, it is not necessary; lack of a second order will not prevent an employee's termination at a later time for subsequent improper actions learned about while an appeal of the first termination was pending. View Court of Appeals Decision | View SPBR Order

Jenkins v. Scioto County Board of Commissioners (Mar. 15, 1996), Scioto App. No. 95CA2372, unreported, 1996 WL 118272. Where appellant's supervisor assigns appellant duties within appellant's position description, and appellant repeatedly refuses to perform such duties without offering any reason for her persistent refusal, appellant is insubordinate and may be removed pursuant to R.C. 124.34. View Court of Appeals Decision | View SPBR Order

McIlwain v. Ferguson (Feb. 5, 1996), Butler App. No. CA95-06-103, unreported, 1996 WL 42332; cert denied (1996) 76 Ohio St.3d 1424. Whether or not an employee's conviction for attempted trafficking in drugs constituted the "off duty sale of illegal drugs" referenced in employer's personnel directives, such conviction is sufficient evidence of a "failure of good behavior" under R.C. 124.34 and the employee may be removed. View Court of Appeals Decision | View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order (Remand) | View Common Pleas Decision (Remanding to SPBR) | View SPBR Order

Fesman v. Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas (Jan. 12, 1996), Hamilton App. No. C-950177, unreported. Appellant's extensive discipline, deteriorating performance, performance evaluation reports, and the language contained in the personnel manual provided sufficient notice to appellant that her poor performance could result in removal. View Court of Appeals Decision | View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Rei v. Hamilton County Auditor (Dec. 29, 1995), Hamilton App. No. C-940752, unreported, 1995 WL 763646. Where an employee of the county auditor was unable to explain why he delayed filing a tax return and/or depositing a check representing the payment of state taxes for a period of time in excess of ten months in one case and six months in another, such actions are a grievous breach of trust as to warrant removal ever for a first-time offense. View Court of Appeals Decision | View SPBR Order

Cameron v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation (1995), 108 Ohio App.3d 20. Where an employee fails to fully comply with the terms of an employment/settlement agreement but substantially complies by fulfilling the terms after the time limit set forth in the agreement, the employee has not substantially breached the contract and his actions are not incompetence or nonfeasance sufficient to support a removal based thereon. View Court of Appeals Decision | View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Hayes v. Montgomery County Board of Commissioners (Sept. 22, 1995), Montgomery App. No. 15086, unreported, 1995 WL 558801. Where appellant was removed for failing to truthfully answer questions on her employment application, the later expungement of her felony conviction does not affect the basis of her termination; the removal is based on dishonesty, not conviction of a crime.

Brown v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (Sept. 18, 1995), Marion App. No. 9-95-13, unreported, 1995 WL 551118; cert denied (1996) 74 Ohio St.3d 1513. Even when appellant has not performed intervening services for an appointing authority for a number of years, a removal order cannot terminate appellant's employment retrospectively; a removal order can be effective only prospectively. View Court of Appeals Decision | View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Arcuragi v. Miami University (May 15, 1995), Preble App. No. CA94-09-024, unreported, 1995 WL 295247; cert denied (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1422. Regardless of whether appellant's instances of misconduct violate a sexual harassment policy or establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment, they may be considered evidence of failure of good behavior and a continuation of prior unacceptable behavior in general, sufficient to justify appellant's removal where appellee alleged both sexual harassment and failure of good behavior in its removal order.

Goggins v. Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court (July 28, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 65632, unreported, 1994 WL 393674. Where an employee accepts payments from probationers but fails to successfully process them, that employee may be removed for neglect of duty; appellant's argument that she could have refused to accept the payments does not constitute a valid excuse for failing to handle the payments in a prompt and appropriate manner.

Carfrey v. Franklin Pre-Release Center (Sept. 28, 1993), Pickaway App. No. 92-CA-31, unreported, 1993 WL 382279. Inappropriate behavior consisting of sexual remarks, gestures, and inappropriate contact may be considered immoral conduct and failure of good behvaior sufficient to merit appellant's removal.

Carmichael v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services (June 10, 1993), Franklin App. No. 92AP-1707, unreported, 1993 WL 220885. R.C. 124.34 provides that a classified employee may be dismissed for insubordination or neglect of duty regardless of whether or not the rules of progressive discipline have been followed. View Court of Appeals Decision | View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Downard v. Industrial Commission of Ohio (May 6, 1993), Franklin App. No. 93AP-101, unreported, 1993 WL 150505. Although Section 11 of H.B. 222 does not prevent the Industrial Commission either from removing an employee for cause or from abolishing a position, it does preclude the Commission from laying off an employee; all employees who are affected by any aspect of the changes and reorganization set forth in Section 1 of HB 222 are protected. View Court of Appeals Decision | View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Lee v. Summit County Sheriff (Apr. 7, 1993), Summit App. No. 15828, unreported, 1993 WL 99870. Failure by an appointing authority to comply with the filing requirements for a notice of removal, contained in R.C. 124.34, constitutes reversible error sufficient to result in a disaffirmance of the removal. View Court of Appeals Decision | View SPBR Order

Marks v. Howe (Aug. 2, 1991), Portage App. No. 90-P-2212, unreported, 1991 WL 147424. The law on the question of where an appeal which attacks the state personnel board of review's jurisdiction must be pursued is governed by the pronouncement in In re Termination, (1974), 40 Ohio St.2d 107, which was later reaffirmed in Davis v. Board of Review, (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 102; appellant properly pursued his appeal of a removal for disciplinary reasons in his county of residence.

Furlow v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services (May 14, 1991), Franklin App. No. 91AP-2, unreported, 1991 WL 81967. The state personnel board of review's affirmance of a removal order is based on reliable, probative and substantial evidence where the evidence supports a finding that there were at least twenty-seven unauthorized long-distance telephone calls made by Appellant, whether or not the original charge or the board was specific as to the number of telephone calls made by appellant which were actually unauthorized.

Hurst v. Ridgeway (Dec. 20, 1990), Marion App. No. 9-89-7, unreported, 1990 WL 209797. The board's decision is not supported by reliable, probative or substantive evidence where a removal order is disaffirmed on grounds not related to the matter for which appellant was removed; evidence concerning appellant's acceptance of responsibility is neither relevant nor reliable.

Short v. Ohio Dept. of Taxation (Mar. 29, 1990), Franklin App. No. 89AP-1009, unreported, 1990 WL 34765. Removal is appropriate where the evidence demonstrates that appellant's production was far less than that of his colleagues, appellee made a good faith effort to establish a fair and reasonable pattern for evaluating appellant's work and, after consultation and suspension, appellant's work continued to be unsatisfactory.

Donohoe v. Franklin County Sheriff (June 7, 1988), Franklin App. No. 87AP-648, unreported, 1988 WL 60426. The failure of a deputy sheriff to respond to an order of a superior officer is insubordination, and grounds for removal; public employees must answer questions in a civil proceeding when their testimony will not be used to incriminate them in a subsequent criminal investigation. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Dehner v. Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District (May 12, 1983), Cuyahoga App. No. 45598, unreported. R.C. 6119.37(A) continues state civil service, for purposes of removal or reductions in pay or position, for any employee of a political subdivision covered by the classified civil service who becomes a sewer district employee when that employee's facility is transferred to the sewer district; typically, that provision applies to an employee of a county or non-chartered city whose employment transfers to the sewer district with the facility employing him. View Court of Appeals Decision

Davis v. Ohio Dept. of Administrative Services (Oct. 20, 1981), Franklin App. No. 80AP-977, unreported, 1981 WL 3539. A public employee may be found guilty of neglect of duty for failing to report to work because he is in jail serving a sentence imposed upon a conviction of disorderly conduct, and subsequently be removed from his position.

Espie v. Board of Education (June 12, 1980), Franklin App. 79AP-886, unreported. A teacher's conviction for grand theft by deception constitutes cause for removal.

State, ex rel. Wagner v. Board of Education (Dec. 21, 1978), Franklin App. No. 78AP-441, unreported. Mandamus is a proper remedy when the removal of a classified employee does not comply with R.C. 124.34.

Smith v. Ohio Dept. of Public Safety (Sept. 25, 1996), Franklin Co., No. 96CVF03-2159, unreported. Where Appellant's experience and job duties were such that Appellant could be expected to perform her job in a competent manner, Appellant may be properly removed for failure to do so. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Johnson v. Hamilton County Board of Commissioners (Feb. 12, 1996), Hamilton Co., No. A9405178, unreported. Lack of culpable intent on the part of Appellant did not constitute sufficient grounds to disaffirm Appellant's removal for engaging in acts of sexual harassment. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Pugin v. Allen County Sheriff's Office (Dec. 25, 1995), Allen Co., No. CV95-07-0323, unreported. Appellant's failure of good behavior in failing to provide requested information is sufficient to support reduction in rank from lieutenant to sergeant, but not removal. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Pernell v. Montgomery County Board of Commissioners (Sept. 18, 1995), Montgomery Co., No. 94-0929, unreported. Where the nature of an employee's employment involves a substantial public interest, the employee is in a safety sensitive position and the employer's drug testing policy provides for random testing when there is reasonable suspicion that job performance is affected, the employer's uncontroverted evidence that the employee gave another employee marijuana offsite, the odor of marijuana was detected in the employee's office and marijuana was found in the employee's home by a sheriff's deputy executing a warrant, the employer's order was reasonable and the employee's refusal to take the test was insubordination and subject to discipline. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Ward v. Attorney General (Sept. 8, 1995), Clermont Co., No. 94CV0268, unreported. As the chief law enforcement officer in the state, the attorney general cannot tolerate as a member of his investigative staff a person who has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude; the fact that the appellant was convicted of a sexual offense involving a minor child and that he was required by virtue of his employment to come into contact with members of the public, including minor children, provided even greater cause of removal. View Common Pleas Decision

Schlupe v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation (Feb. 24, 1995), Summit Co., Nos. CV89-12-3860, CV90-07-2224, unreported. An appointing authority is within the authority provided by O.A.C. 124-3-01(C) and R.C. 124.34 in withdrawing its original removal order and issuing a second removal order pursuant to the requirements of O.A.C. 124-3-01. View Common Pleas Decision

Clark v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction (Nov. 21, 1994), Franklin Co., No. 94CVF-06-3997, unreported. A collective bargaining agreement which provides for final and binding arbitration of grievances may bargain away employees' rights to grieve or to appeal their removal to the state personnel board of review. View Common Pleas Decision

Beno v. Ashtabula County Nursing Home (Feb. 11, 1993), PBR 92-REM-05-0266; aff'd (Mar. 11, 1993), Full Board; aff'd (Sept. 16, 1993), Ashtabula Co., No. 95401, unreported. Damage to an automobile owned by the spouse of Appellee's employee, where the spouse is not also employed by the appointing authority, may not form the basis of a violation of the appointing authority's policies and, thus, the employee's removal. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Beno v. Ashtabula County Nursing Home (Feb. 11, 1993), PBR 92-REM-05-0266; aff'd (Mar. 11, 1993), Full Board; aff'd (Sept. 16, 1993), Ashtabula Co., No. 95401, unreported. Charging an individual with a criminal offense is not tantamount to trial and conviction and does not mean that the person committed the acts alleged. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Caldwell v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation (May 25, 1993), Ashtabula Co., No. 93855, unreported. The court of common pleas of the county of employee's residence is the proper forum only for appeals of disciplinary removals and reductions in pay; all other types of personnel actions are appealable exclusively in Franklin County. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Butler County Sheriff v. Brown (Feb. 2, 1993), PBR 93-REM-01-0081; aff'd (Feb. 14, 1994) Butler Co., No. CV93-02-0200, unreported. Sheriff-elect has no authority to remove an employee prior to assuming the office of Sheriff. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Watson v. Kent State University (Aug. 27, 1992), Franklin Co., No. 92CVF-01-799. A classified civil service employee may appeal his removal only in the common pleas court of his residence. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Corrections (Aug. 7, 1992), Pickaway Co., No. 91-CI-000178, unreported. Where an appointing authority files with the state personnel board of review a copy of a removal order that does not bear the original signature of the appointing authority, the appointing authority may, pursuant to O.A.C. 124:03-03-6, demonstrate the authenticity of the signature and the authority of the signer; the order should be remanded to the appointing authority for correction rather than disaffirmed sua sponte by the board. View Common Pleas Decision

Madison Correctional Institution v. Wamsley (Aug. 5, 1992), Ross Co., No. 92-CI-49, unreported. Where an appointing authority fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations contained in a R.C. 124.34 removal order, the decision of the state personnel board of review to modify the discipline imposed is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Currington v. Franklin County Sheriff (July 30, 1992), PBR No. 92-IDS-01-0041; aff'd (Aug. 21, 1992), Full Board; aff'd (July 1993), Franklin Co., No. 92CVF09-7012. If an appointing authority feels an employee cannot perform the substantial and material duties of his job, the appointing authority can contact a designated doctor to examine and determine if, indeed, the employee can or cannot perform the duties of his position; absent medical evidence presented to establish that an employee could not perform his job duties, termination of the employee by the appointing authority is a de facto removal and governed by the provisions of R.C. 124.34. View SPBR Order

Thomas v. Central Ohio Psychiatric Hospital (Nov. 12, 1991), Franklin Co., No. 91CVF-03-2315, unreported. A patient/discharged patient-employee relationship with sexual overtones, whether or not actual sexual conduct was demonstrated, constitutes an ethical violation and removal is an appropriate form of discipline. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Finch v. Clermont County Board of Commissioners (Oct. 9, 1991), Clermont Co., No. 91CV-0652, unreported. R.C. 124.34 requires the filing of a notice of removal with the state personnel board of review and R.C. 124.03(F) authorizes the board to make reasonable rules relating to the procedures of the board, including regulatory rules governing the contents of orders of removal; therefore, O.A.C. 124-03-01 is a lawful exercise of the rule-making authority of the board and a summary disaffirmance based upon that rule is appropriate as a matter of law. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Rice v. Cuyahoga County Dept. of Human Services (July 31, 1991), PBR 90-REM-09-0953; aff'd (Sept. 4, 1991), Full Board; aff'd (NO DATE), Cuyahoga Co., No. 218266, unreported. Where appellant's incompetence and disregard for her job duties contributed to fraud perpetrated upon the appointing authority, removal is an appropriate form of discipline. View SPBR Order

Rodock v. Franklin County Sheriff (Apr. 30, 1991), PBR 90-REM-09-0928; aff'd (June 17, 1991), Full Board; aff'd (Sept. 1992), Franklin Co., No. 91CVF06-5036, unreported. Where an employee consents to a physical examination but refuses to sign a consent and release form for the examination, the employee constructively refuses to submit to the examination and his actions constitute insubordination. View SPBR Order

Carr v. University of Cincinnati (May 24, 1991), Hamilton Co., No. A-9005821, unreported; dismissed (NO DATE), Hamilton App. No. C9104752, unreported. The state personnel board of review lacks jurisdiction over the appeals of employees removed during the second half of their probationary periods. View Common Pleas Decision

Campbell v. Franklin County Sheriff (Aug. 31, 1990), Franklin Co., Nos. 90-CVH-04-2800 and 90-CVH-04-2766, unreported. Absent any proof that the reputation of the Franklin County sheriff's department was injured, appellant's misdeameanor violation of a safety statute in another county and subsequent report of the incident to the appointing authority in compliance with departmental regulations does not constitute unbecoming conduct sufficient to warrant suspension or removal. View Common Pleas Decision

Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation (Sept. 25, 1985), Madison Co., No. 85CV-02-022, unreported. Where the R.C. 124.34 order removing employee from his position charges him with violation of the criminal felony of carrying a concealed weapon but fails to state specifically the statutory grounds for his removal, the notice of removal is sufficient, as a matter of law, to apprise the employee of the reasons for removal; liberal discovery provided the employee an opportunity to ascertain the statutory grounds for removal if he felt such specificity were required. View Common Pleas Decision

Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation (Sept. 25, 1985), Madison Co., No. 85CV-02-022, unreported. The judgment of guilt of a felony constitutes a predicate of removal and not the plea itself; it is irrelevant whether the finding was based on a plea of guilty, a plea of no contest or a determination of guilt by a jury. View Common Pleas Decision

Adams v. Mariemont District Board of Education (Sept. 2, 1983), Hamilton Co., No. C-820621. Where as part of a labor dispute, a teacher willfully and deliberately refuses, over a period of several days, to report for work and to perform the various duties set forth in the contract of employment, while ignoring a school board's order to return to work, there exists "other good and just cause" for the termination of the teaching contract within the meaning of R.C. 3319.16.

Tinkham v. Athens County Engineer (Aug. 27, 1996), PBR Case No. 95-REM-02-0086, Full Board. A supervisor holding a safety-sensitive position and who may be required to operate or supervise those who operate heavy machinery at any time of the day or night poses an imminent threat to others when under the influence of alcohol or drugs, taken on or off the job, and may be removed for testing positive on a random drug test. View SPBR Order

Druckenbrod v. University of Akron (Feb. 15, 1994), PBR 93-REM-04-0280; aff'd (Mar. 31, 1994), Full Board. Where appellant consistently treated supervisors and co-workers with a lack of respect and contempt, such conduct may rise to the level of insubordination contemplated by R.C. 124.34, which is sufficient to merit removal. View SPBR Order

Finney-Braner v. Madison County Dept. of Human Services (Jan. 4, 1994), PBR 92-REM-01-0004 and 91-RED-06-0394; aff'd (Jan. 26, 1994), Full Board. The failure to report the possible abuse of a child is a serious allegation and may be regarded in a more serious light than other allegations. View SPBR Order

Arrington v. Cuyahoga County Dept. of Human Services (July 22, 1993), PBR 92-REM-06-0357; aff'd (Sept. 21, 1993), Full Board. Removal is an appropriate discipline where an employee was negligent, in that he failed to become certified on the CRIS-E system as required, verbally abused a client, failed to provide prompt and courteous treatment to a client and was unfit to work as a result of excessive consumption of alcohol. View SPBR Order

Revercomb v. Licking County Board of Commissioners (May 17, 1993), PBR 92-REM-12-0774; aff'd (June 15, 1993), Full Board. Removal is an appropriate discipline where an employee appears to possess a good overall performance record and is generally conscientious but, nevertheless, continually violates direct instructions which have a substantial impact upon her job duties. View SPBR Order

Martin v. Franklin County Sheriff (Jan. 4, 1993), PBR 91-RMD-08-0453; aff'd (Feb. 3, 1993), Full Board. The exercise of poor judgment, in the absence of any previous discipline and the absence of a violation of departmental regulations, does not justify a reduction or thirty-day suspension, but does warrant a minimal punishment. View SPBR Order

Conley v. Franklin County Board of Commissioners (Dec. 29, 1992), PBR 92-REM-07-0510; aff'd (Jan. 22, 1993), Full Board. Where appellant has failed consistently for more than one and one-half years to meet production goals, despite counseling and various other attempts to offer assistance, and the appointing authority has satisfactorily established a history of prior and progressive discipline, removal is an appropriate form of discipline. View SPBR Order

Beck v. Harrison County Dept. of Human Services (July 27, 1992), PBR 91-REM-04-0262; dismissed (May, 1993), Harrison Co. No. 18118, unreported. Where an individual's actions as a private citizen and actions as a civil servant have become so intermingled as to suggest to the general public a conflict of interest and result in the appearance of impropriety, the individual has committed misfeasance, which is an appropriate basis for discipline; the type of discipline merited by the misfeasance is dependent on the presence of mitigating circumstances. View SPBR Order

Benton v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services (June 22, 1992), PBR 92-REM-02-0080; aff'd (Aug. 18, 1992), Full Board. Where an interim employee is returned to his former position following a decision by the appointing authority not to fill the interim position temporarily occupied by the employee, that employee is not removed and an appeal is inappropriate. View SPBR Order

Jones v. Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners (Jan. 3, 1992), PBR No. 91-REM-04-0224; aff'd (Feb. 5, 1992), Full Board. In order to support an allegation of gross neglect of duty set forth in a removal order, the appointing authority must establish 1) that a duty existed on the part of appellant; 2) that appellant was aware of that duty before it was allegedly breached; 3) that the duty was, in fact, breached; and 4) that the duty was breached in such a manner as to rise to the level of gross neglect. View SPBR Order

Jones v. Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners (Jan. 3, 1992), PBR No. 91-REM-04-0224; aff'd (Feb. 5, 1992), Full Board. In order to support an allegation of gross insubordination set forth in a removal order, the appointing authority must establish 1) that a direct order was given to appellant either in writing or orally; 2) that the direct order was wilfully or intentionally disobeyed; or 3) that the disobedience was so severe as to rise to the level of gross insubordination. View SPBR Order

Evans v. Broadview Developmental Center (Oct. 16, 1990), PBR 90-REM-04-0171. An interim part-time employee has a right to the term of employment whose parameters were determined by the disability of the incumbent; as a classified employee, the interim part-time employee was entitled to an R.C. 124.34 order setting forth the reasons for his dismissal, as a minimal requirement of due process. View SPBR Order

Zieroff v. Lucas County Sheriff (Sept. 19, 1990), PBR 90-REM-02-0103. In order for a removal to be upheld, appellee must prove the allegations contained in the removal order; where appellant is removed for allegedly fabricating a report, appellee may not merely allege that appellant's report contains inconsistencies, but must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the incident did not take place. View SPBR Order

Stephens v. Hamilton County Dept. of Human Services (Sept. 18, 1986), PBR 86-REM-04-0470. Where appellee has no knowledge as to how long appellant will reside at a temporary address, and a removal order sent by certified mail to appellant's permanent address was duly accepted at that address on appellant's behalf, appellee has complied with the requirements of O.A.C. 124-3-02(A) and the time period for an appeal of the removal order begins to run. View SPBR Order

Young v. Hocking Correctional Facility (Aug. 12, 1986), PBR 86-REM-02-0178. Removal is an appropriate discipline where an employee placed a sign in the window of his vehicle criticizing his employer's personnel policies, repeatedly refused to remove the sign and disrupted the workplace by his actions; the employee's insubordination and continuing defiant attitude toward legitimate authority indicate that a suspension would not alleviate the problem. View SPBR Order

Tuttle v. Ashtabula County Sheriff (May 23, 1986), PBR 85-REM-12-1790. Removal is proper when a police officer has engaged in conduct unbecoming of an officer by having sexual relations with a child. View SPBR Order

Carnahan v. Mahoning County Engineer (Apr. 2, 1986) PBR 85-REM-11-1710. Regardless of the appointing authority's failure to file a R.C. 124.34 removal order with the state personnel board of review or to notify appellant of his right to appeal the action, appellant's filing of an appeal five years after his removal was not within a reasonable time period and was untimely. View SPBR Order

Bleininger v. Tuscarawas County Dept. of Human Services (Sept. 29, 1982), PBR 82-REM-06-2080. An employee may not be removed for failure of good behavior where employer fails to follow progressive discipline scheme and generally permits the employee to behave in such a manner; suspension, however, may be an appropriate discipline. View SPBR Order

1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 097. If, in the absence of an express workrule governing such conduct, a classified employee of a court of common pleas secretly tape records a meeting involving other employees or clients, the tape may be used as the basis for discipline of the employee who made the secret recording, if the facts of the particular instance evidence a cause for discipline or discharge as provided in R.C. 124.34 and the imposition of the discipline does not discriminate on the basis of a protected status or employee activity. View Attorney General Opinion

1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 097. If a classified employee of a court of common pleas secretly tape records a meeting involving other employees, the tape may be used as a basis for disicpline of an employee whose misconduct is documented on the secret recording unless the tape is excluded from evidence pursuant to R.C. 2933.62 on the grounds that the recording violates the provisions of R.C. 2933.52. View Attorney General Opinion

    A. Nexus/Off-Duty Conduct

Masino v. United States (Ct.Cl. 1978), 589 F.2d 1048. Specific harm to performance in a particular job need not be shown where the misconduct is of such a nature as to undermine public confidence in the agency generally.

Fabio v. Civil Service Commission (1980), 414 A.2d 82. Removal is proper when an employee's private life is the center of rumors, when it adversely affects his fellow workers, when it corrupts his family members, and when it results in complaints to his employer, governmental intervention is warranted, since a police officer has a duty to maintain an honorable official as well as a private life.

Jones v. Franklin County Sheriff (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 40. A police officer is guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer while off duty when she is a party to "vigilante activity" which is clearly outside the scope of official job duties; a police officer must answer questions that relate specifically and narrowly to the performance of her official duties when they are asked in an internal affairs division hearing and when the officer is guaranteed that the answers cannot be used against her in any subsequent criminal proceeding.

Craddolph v. Ackerman (1978), 57 Ohio App.2d 150. Off-duty criminal conduct involving acts of dishonesty warrant removal, subject only to the discretion of the appointing authority.

Craddolph v. Ackerman (1978), 57 Ohio App.2d 150. Dishonesty of an employee or office holder need not be job-related; where there is dishonesty of an officer or employee in the classified service there is no need to find a relationship with employment and there is no need to become involved with the question of nexus.

In re Chase (1976), 50 Ohio App.2d 393. Removal of a highway patrolman is proper when his conduct is immoral and he associates during off-duty hours with persons of a quality not acceptable by good standards.

Ayers v. State Civil Service Commission (1958), 106 Ohio App. 511. A state law-enforcement officer's conduct in driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, with resulting imposition of a substantial fine and jail term, constitutes a failure of good behavior and cause for removal from the state classified civil service under the provisions of R.C. 143.27 (now R.C. 124.34), whether such offense was committed while the officer was off duty or while he was on the job.

Ford v. City of Cincinnati (1939), 15 Ohio Op. 127. A police lieutenant who openly consorts with a prostitute while off duty may be removed on the ground of immoral conduct as well as failure of good behavior, within the meaning of those terms as used in Section 486-17a, General Code.

Stover v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Dec. 21, 1987), Franklin App. No. 87AP-569, unreported, 1987 WL 31256. No nexus need be proved to substantiate grounds for removal under R.C. 124.34 in the face of convications for theft by deception; the very nature of the offense as a matter of law establishes the relationship and supports an appointing authority's imposition of sanctions under R.C. 124.34. View Court of Appeals Decision | View Common Pleas Decision

Turner v. Krob (May 23, 1985), Cuyahoga App. No. 49162, unreported, 1985 WL 9050. A misdemeanor conviction in and of itself does not constitute sufficient reason for discharging a police officer who, but for that conviction, has an unblemished record of service to the community.

In re Appeal of Wilkerson (Apr. 27, 1984), Montgomery App. No. CA-8530, unreported. Misfeasance, malfeasance, non-feasance and misconduct in office are broad, general concepts designed to include additional violations for removal other than those specifically enumerated; misconduct in office implies that misconduct off duty is already included in the language of R.C. 505.49. View Court of Appeals Decision

In re Appeal of Wilkerson (Apr. 27, 1984), Montgomery App. No. CA-8530, unreported. The official duty of a police officer is to enforce obedience to the law by others; to construe this to mean officially on duty or during hours assigned is to restrict the purpose of R.C. 505.491; the duty to personally obey, as well as enforce, the law is inherent in the occupation of a police officer. View Court of Appeals Decision

Engle v. Netter (May 23, 1978), Ross App. No. 77-CI-417, unreported. A prison guard's conviction for a misdemeanor assault does not support removal when the regulations of the Ohio department of rehabilitation and corrections contain "no employment sanction for a finding of guilt as to a non-job related misdemeanor" and when the act is not one of moral turpitude, fraud or dishonesty which might allow dismissal under R.C. 124.34.

Craddolph v. Ackerman (Apr. 18, 1978), Franklin App. No. 77AP-893, unreported. There is no need to find a relationship with employment and there is no need to become involved with the question of nexus when there is dishonesty of an officer or employee in the classified service; however, the testimony her nevertheless satisfied the nexus test.

Risner v. State Personnel Board of Review (Feb. 14, 1978), Franklin App. No. 77AP-763, unreported. Appellant's conduct does not violate R.C. 124.34 and an administrative violation when there is not a necessary relationship between the bad conduct and the employment.

Ebenger v. Dept. of Industrial Relations (Sept. 18, 1978), Franklin Co., No. 78-CV-02-481, unreported. Impermissible conduct in the form of dishonesty need not be job related to constitute a failure of good behavior within the meaning of R.C. 124.34.

Booher v. Lake County Board of MR/DD (Jan. 10, 1990), PBR 89-REM-09-0478. Even if Appellant's offenses took place off duty, if Appellant's infractions are so serious as to create a nexus between the grounds for discipline and Appellant's job duties, there is no necessity for progressive disciplinary action. View SPBR Order

Hannah v. Ohio Dept. of Highway Safety (Jan. 30, 1986), PBR 85-REM-09-1407. The fact that Appellant was not engaged in his job at the time he committed the crimes of violence and immorality does not insulate him from discipline; the nexus test is satisfied in that there was a fear for the safety and well being of the employees who had to work under Appellant. View SPBR Order

    B. Probationary Removals

Walton v. Montgomery County Welfare Dept. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 58. The state personnel board of review lacks jurisdiction to review removals on the merits during the second half of an employee's probationary period.

Clark v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation (Aug. 16, 1993), Fayette App. No. CA93-03-009, unreported, 1993 WL 306763. The alleged violation of several administrative code provisions by appellant's second-half probationary period removal does not confer jurisdiction on the state personnel board of review.

Whittaker v. Rice (June 17, 1991), Montgomery App. No. 11993, unreported, 1991 WL 108742. The factual determination of whether an appellant was in the second half of her probationary period is crucial to the determination of the state personnel board of review's jurisdiction; it would be a waste of time for the parties and the board to conduct a hearing on the merits without first determining the jurisdictional issue.

Carr v. University of Cincinnati (May 24, 1991), Hamilton Co., No. A-9005821, unreported; dismissed (NO DATE), Hamilton App. No. C9104752, unreported. The state personnel board of review lacks jurisdiction over the appeals of employees removed during the second half of their probationary periods. View Common Pleas Decision

Jordan v. Office of Criminal Justice Services (May 15, 1996), Franklin Co., No. 95CVF05-3475, unreported. Where Appellant occupied a position covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement, was serving his initial probationary period, and the pertinent agreement provided for removal at Appellee's sole discretion during the probationary period, the agreement prevails and the State Personnel Board of Review has no jurisdiction over an appeal of Appellant's probationary removal. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order