State, ex rel. Zone v. City of Cleveland (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 1. Mandamus will not lie to compel a municipality to pay back wages to municipal skilled employees who contend they were de facto appointed to "foreman" positions by their supervisors and thus were entitled to the prevailing wage rates for such positions established between skilled building tradesmen and employers in the private sector, in the absence of a prior appointment to those positions.

Moore v. Agin (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 173. The promotional procedures of R.C. Ch. 124. are properly suspended to allow an appointment to the position of chief of police when extraordinary circumstances exist, as outlined in R.C. 124.30(B), which dictate that competition would be impracticable.

State, ex rel. Gibbons v. Cleveland (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 216. No legal right to back pay can be established before an appointment has occurred, regardless of the reasons for the failure to appoint.

Leibson v. Ohio Dept. of MR/DD (1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 751. Statute providing that classified employee appointed to unclassified position shall retain the right to resume classified position and status held immediately prior to his appointment covers all affected classified service employees in Ohio Dept. of MR/DD, regardless of whether employee's position in unclassified civil service was covered by a collective bargaining agreement; statute imposes mandatory duty on MR/DD to provide the employee with the right to resume his immediately prior position and status.

Veney v. Massillon Psychiatric Center (1991), 66 Ohio App.3d 665. "Revocation of appointment," for purposes of rules covering civil service, does not sever total employment but merely reverts unclassified employee to his prior status as classified employee; "removal of employee," for purposes of civil service, involves complete termination of an unclassified employee for cause which is sufficient to terminate a classified employee.

Veney v. Massillon Psychiatric Center (1991), 66 Ohio App.3d 665. Revocation of appointment of state employee as a nonclassified service employee, and his return to prior position within classified service, was a "revocation of appointment" which did not require hearing or other procedures applicable to removal of employee.

Springfield Command Officers Association v. Springfield City Commission (1990), 62 Ohio App.3d 301; cert denied 58 Ohio St.3d 701. Provisions in municipal charter adopted pursuant to constitution which pertain to appointment of officers within city's police force are exercise of local self-government and thus prevail in event of conflict with statutory civil service provisions.

Esselburne v. Ohio Dept. of Agriculture (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 37; cert denied 40 Ohio St.3d 710. The exercise of an appointment under R.C. 124.11(A)(8) could lawfully result in the abolishment of an occupied classified position where 1) the appointing authority appoints unclassified assistants pursuant to R.C. 124.11(A)(8); 2) a determination of the need for a reduction of the work force is made; 3) a determination of the position or positions to be abolished to fulfill this need is made; and 4) the classified employee is notified of the job abolishment, with all these steps being accomplished within the procedures provided by R.C. 124.321 et seq.

Beyer v. Donaldson (1978), 57 Ohio App.2d 24. Where the charter of a city obligates the city manager to make all appointments and removals in the administrative and executive service of the city, provided they are in consonance with state laws respecting civil service, such supersedes the provision of a statute relating to the suspension of police officers by a chief of police.

State, ex rel. Click v. Thormyer (1958), 105 Ohio App. 479. In the absence of an eligible civil service list, a civil service employee, provisionally appointed after a noncompetitive examination and upon approval of the civil service commission, becomes an appointee in the classified service.

Mingyar v. Ohio Dept. of Development (Aug. 31, 1993), Franklin App. No. 92AP-1795, unreported, 1993 WL 342569. Where an employee is improperly appointed to his position, he cannot claim to have been prejudiced by the manner in which he was discharged from a position he had no right to hold; being improperly hired as a state employee does not give one the right to claim the benefits and protections of being in the classified service of the state. View Court of Appeals Decision | View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

State, ex rel. Thomas v. Dawson (Dec. 1, 1992), Franklin App. No. 92AP-718, unreported, 1992 WL 361827. A public officer as distinguished from an employee must possess some sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public, either of an executive, legislative or judicial character; an individual employed on a seasonal basis as a Data Processor I does not hold public office for purposes of bringing an action in quo warranto.

Thomas v. Municipal Civil Service Commission of Athens (Mar. 20, 1986), Athens App. No. 1257, unreported, 1986 WL 3410. R.C. 124.11(A)(3) term "heads of departments appointed by the mayor" does not require an express appointment by the mayor, together with an ordinance authorizing such appointment. View Court of Appeals Decision

Caldwell v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation (June 16, 1992), PBR 91-LAY-03-0147 and (Feb. 7, 1992), PBR 91-INV-03-0148; aff'd (Mar. 16, 1992), Full Board. Appointment as an interim employee, in accordance with R.C. 124.30 and O.A.C. 123:1-47-01(A)(41), does not create the status of a provisional appointee, and R.C. 124.241 does not convert the status of the incumbent's employment, following two years of continuous service within the position, to that of a certified, permanent employee. View Common Pleas Decision | View SPBR Order

Glunt v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation (Nov. 12, 1987), PBR 87-RED-08-0645. Where an interim appointment continues for four months after the effective end of the period of disability for which the interim appointment was made and the appointing authority acts with reasonable diligence to select an applicant after the vacant position is posted, the incumbent employee is not entitled to the position by default and is not reduced in position when another applicant is selected to fill the vacancy. View SPBR Order

1965 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 177. A sheriff may appoint in writing one or more deputies, and such deputies hold their appointment only during the pleasure of the appointing sheriff.